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P 231326Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9793
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8742
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6115
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0078
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RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4679
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6085
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6963
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1731
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1617
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

SIPDIS 



E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019 

TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR ENVR BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS 



REF: A. 08 LAPAZ 2606 

¶B. LA PAZ 6 


¶C. LA PAZ 11 

¶D. LA PAZ 62 

¶E. LA PAZ 90 



Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Joe Relk for reasons 1.4 (b, d) 



¶1. (C) Summary:  With the January 25 constitutional 

referendum rapidly approaching, all signs point to victory 

for President Morales and his ruling Movement Toward 

Socialism (MAS) party.  Although the opposition has made 


inroads into the MAS lead, most national polls point to 

between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed 

constitution (with one government poll showing 66 percent), 

and the MAS appears set to leverage its considerable rural 

base to victory.  After a series of national news articles 

raised questions about significant fraud in the August 2008 

recall referendum, the National Electoral Court has taken 

pains to advertise the electoral rolls as secure.  However, a 

recent poll shows less than half of the public shares the 


court's confidence, and the opposition believes significant 

electoral fraud is likely.  While cheating seems unnecessary 

to secure victory for the MAS, padding their lead would give 

the party leverage in congressional negotiations regarding 

legislation implementing hundreds of vague constitutional 

clauses.  Opposition leaders continue to fear the MAS will 

use any stalemate in these negotiations to close congress and 

institute rule by decree.  At both the national and regional 

levels, the margin of victory matters.  A landslide for the 


MAS nationally, or large victories for the opposition in the 

eastern departments, could spark more conflict.  End summary. 



- - - - - - - - - - - - - 

MAS Victory Seems Assured 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - 



¶2. (C) With the January 25 constitutional referendum rapidly 

approaching, all signs point to victory for President Morales 

and his ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party. 


Although the opposition has made inroads into their lead, 

causing the MAS to tone down its rhetoric, national polls 

point to between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed 

constitution.  (One government poll shows the "yes" vote 

winning by 66 percent.)  However, many polls downplay or 

ignore the MAS' rural base.  Almost as importantly, the MAS 

seems prepared to take at least five of the nine departments, 

including La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, Cochabamba, and Pando, with 

Beni a distinct possibility.  If the MAS can win at levels 


similar to their August 2008 referendum victory (i.e. 67 

percent or more) and can make inroads into the "Media Luna" 

or eastern half of the country, they will have much more 

leverage in upcoming congressional negotiations over 

implementing legislation. 



- - - - - - 

Polling Data 

- - - - - - 




¶3. (C) Polling data has varied widely over the past two 

weeks, due to a combination of a tightening race and polling 

methodologies (i.e. city vs. rural).  Recent national polls 

by Gallup and Apoyo within the last week show approval for 

the constitution with a much slimmer lead than many expected, 

ahead only 48 to 42 percent and 49 to 43 percent, 

respectively.  Ipsos and Mori both conducted polls of capital 

cities and both found the "yes" vote ahead, with Ipsos 


showing a 59 to 35 percent lead and Mori reporting 60 to 40 

percent.  However, our contacts tell us all these polls 

partially or totally ignored the rural vote, where the MAS 

has much of its base.  A poll by Observatorio de Gestion 

Publica, publicized by government-friendly Radio Patria 

Nueva, marked the constitution's lead at 66 percent, versus 

31 percent against.  Some estimate a six percent "bump" when 

the rural vote is included. 




¶4. (U) Polls showing a breakdown 

by city or region indicate 

the constitution will easily win in at least four 

departments: La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, and Cochabamba, likely 

with at least 70 percent support in each.  The MAS has a 

distinct chance to capture both Pando and Beni as well.  In 

Pando, the Observatorio poll shows Pando department split 

evenly, and the Ipsos poll shows the capital city of Cobija 

supporting the constitution by a ratio of 64 to 36.  Polling 


data for Beni has been more scattershot, but although its 

capital city of Trinidad is firmly against the constitution, 

by as much as 88 percent, the larger city of Riberalta is 

leaning for approval of the constitution.  The Observatorio 

poll shows Beni evenly split as a department. 



- - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Rural and Indigenous Role 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - 




¶5. (SBU) Although the opposition is making a mighty effort 

across the country to rally against the constitution, the 

forces of inertia seem to be conspiring against them, 

particularly in the form of a largely uneducated rural base 

in the Altiplano.  Leading daily La Razon interviewed several 

community leaders from the Altiplano, and their supporters, 

and reported on January 18 that neither the leaders nor the 

supporters had read the Constitution.  Instead, the repeated 


message was that rural communities would take their marching 

orders from the MAS, and vote for the constitution. According 

to the Ipso poll of capital cities, only four percent of 

respondents said they had read much or all of the 

constitution, 45 percent of respondents said they have read 

some, and 50 percent said they had read none of the draft 

text.  In the countryside, the number of those reading the 

constitution is much lower.  Post suspects disinterest, blind 

faith in Evo Morales' political project, and illiteracy, 


despite the Cuban literacy program, all play a role.  In 

addition, the sheer volume of the 411-article constitution 

probably scares some potential readership away. 



¶6. (C) However, despite the overall level of MAS dominance 

among campesinos and indigenous voters, some opposition does 

exist, albeit for a variety of reasons.  The xxxxxxxxxxxx, has tried to rally 

support against the MAS and the proposed constitution (Reftel 


A).  In a meeting with PolOffs, they lamented the way the MAS 

had "cheated" and "fooled" campesinos into believing Morales 

was himself truly indigenous or cared about indigenous 

issues.  Although they held a national meeting on January 17 

and tried to reach out to the press, they sounded defeated 

when they acknowledged that the MAS, through a combination of 

funding and pressure on local social and business leaders, 

held a "vertical control" in the countryside that would be 

difficult to break.  They also noted rural communities tended 


to vote in blocks, supporting one political party until they 

discarded it to vote en masse for another. 



¶7. (C) Going in a completely different direction, some rural 

social groups and far-left leaders, such as Achacachi Mayor 

Eugenio Rojas and El Alto City Councilor Roberto de La Cruz 

also publicly recommended voting against it because it was 

seen as not revolutionary enough.  They criticized the 

government for making too many concessions to the opposition 


during the constitutional compromise reached on October 21, 

including the agreement to not make land reform retroactive. 

However, they have a relatively small following, and some, 

like de La Cruz, eventually reversed course as the projected 

MAS margin of victory shrunk in January.  Edgar Patana, 

leader of the regional workers union (COR), other El Alto 

union leaders, and the majority of social groups have 

recommended voting for the constitution. 




- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Opposition Feisty, But Realistic 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 



¶8. (C) The opposition has not given up, but seems to be 

battling 

more to limit the margin of defeat than to win.  In 

Santa Cruz,xxxxxxxxxxxx

told EmbOff that polls show an overwhelming victory for the 


"No" vote in Santa Cruz, but that he is worried about the 

opposition's goal of winning in five of Bolivia's nine 

departments (Reftel E).  Although a current 

privately-commissioned opposition poll showed the 

constitution ahead by a margin of only five points, 39 to 34 

percent (with 20 percent undecided), opposition alternate 

xxxxxxxxxxxx doubted the opposition would be able to 

win the referendum outright even under the most optimistic 

scenario.  He predicted that Morales would succeed in 


personalizing the constitution as "Evo's constitution" and 

leverage his cult of personality.  Ultimately xxxxxxxxxxxx was more 

concerned with the margin of the opposition's defeat and 

discrediting the results of "any election that uses this 

voter roll" (Reftel C). 



¶9. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx has been 

criss-crossing the country with opposition xxxxxxxxxxxx 

xxxxxxxxxxxx, campaigning against the proposed constitution, but 


also building a foundation for a likely run for the 

presidency. xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed opposition leaders put aside 

jockeying to be the 2009 opposition unity presidential 

candidate in the final days of the "no" campaign to "attack 

the government from three sides:" the prefects (governors) 

who been traveling around the Media Luna to show &they are 

not afraid" of government threats to arrest them and 

galvanize support in opposition departments, a group of three 


presidential contenders to show opposition unity and 

xxxxxxxxxxxx, who is used for more cerebral attacks on the CPE 

and to &dismiss the governments mythology that they 

exclusively represent the indigenous.8  xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that 

opposition parties Podemos and MNR are playing a deliberately 

muted role, recognizing that their unpopular association with 

the &old regimes8 would play into MAS strategy.  "Political 


parties are bad words in Bolivia," xxxxxxxxxxxx 

xxxxxxxxxxxx La 

Paz-based group of mostly young professionals who focus on 

issues and distance themselves from the party moniker.  "We 

need parties, but we need to start from scratch, without the 

old leaders.  This will take time." 



¶10. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told 

PolOff the opposition is chipping away at the MAS referendum 


lead despite the government's leviathan advantage in 

resources by de-personalizing the constitution and 

"convincing people on the street that is not in their best 

interests."  Although he conceded the "no" campaign would 

ultimately be a losing effort, he cited the emerging feud 

between Morales and Church, corruption charges against 

government officials, and the increasingly precarious economy 

as emerging factors in December and January that created an 

opposition "surge" after "we were so depressed" in the fall. 

xxxxxxxxxxxx said that the government's newfound mobilization of 

congressmen and deputies to challenge the opposition view on 

television and radio shows is proof of government panic. 

"Before they just thought they could ignore us (and win)," 

said xxxxxxxxxxxx.  "They said there was no opposition." xxxxxxxxxxxx 

agreed, and added that this is playing into the opposition's 

hands, because they "are forced to defend a constitution they 

often know little about."  According to xxxxxxxxxxxx has 

been challenging MAS supporters to debate him during his 


speaking tours and embarrassed Vice Minister of Social Groups 

Sacha Llorenti in a January 20 debate when he started talking 

in fluent Aymara.  He asked the dumbstruck Llorenti what he 

planned to do if the constitution passed, since all public 

officials will be required to speak one of Bolivia's 

indigenous languages.  Later he challenged President Morales 

to debate him in Aymara, which the president allegedly speaks 

poorly. 




- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Fraud, Doubts, and Questions 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 





¶11. (C) The National Electoral Court (CNE), which will 

oversee and ratify the results of the referendum, has 

undertaken a public relations campaign to assure the public 

of the security of the election rolls, which came under 

scrutiny after leading daily La Razon published a series of 


articles questioning the validity of the August 10, 2008 

recall referendum.  Several contacts, including xxxxxxxxxxxx 

xxxxxxxxxxxx, told us the MAS padded their 

August referendum victory by five to seven points through 

fraud at several levels (reftel C).  While many international 

observers groups are expected to view the January 25 

constitutional referendum -- including the European Union, 

the OAS, the Carter Center, the UN, the CAN, the 

South-American and Andean parliaments, and UNASUR (septel) -- 


the depth of the earlier fraud has muted the opposition's 

confidence in observers' ability to ensure the results are 

fair.  Members of the Santa Cruz civic committee told EmbOff 

that they have no faith in international observers.  The 

committee has met with the OAS team already and "told our 

side of the story", describing the discoveries of tens of 

thousands of false voter cards and the statistical signs of 

fraud in areas that managed to vote 100 percent for President 

Morales in the August 2008 referendum.  However, the civic 


committee said that the fact that international observers 

blessed the August referendum means they do not expect an 

honest review of the constitutional referendum.  Civic 

committee members also noted that small numbers of observers, 

generally based in the city, will not be able to stop 

widespread fraud in the countryside, which is where they 

believe most of the August 10 fraud took place. 



¶12. (C) In a press conference designed to bolster confidence 


in the security of the electoral rolls, National Electoral 

Court (CNE) President Jose Luis Exeni presented a PowerPoint 

describing the bill of clean health given by the OAS.  As 

part of the presentation, he showed the number of voters 

dropped from the rolls for not participating in prior 

elections and the number added during this cycle.  While all 

departments projected to vote against the constitution had a 

net reduction in the voter rolls, including 85,000 Crucenos 

and 17,000 Benianos, MAS strongholds including La Paz 


(38,000) and Potosi (16,000) saw substantial gains -- a 

curious reckoning, considering population and migration 

trends to the contrary. 



- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Pando At Center of Storm, Again 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 



¶13. (C) While it is possible the constitution could pass in 

Beni, most opposition leaders tell us the MAS has set its 


sights on lightly-populated Pando department as its best 

chance to win in five departments.  By winning the popular 

vote and a majority of the departments, the MAS could more 

credibly claim to have support throughout the country.  Pando 

has also traditionally aligned with the opposition, so a 

breakthrough win there would send a strong signal that the 

strength of the MAS continues to rise.  And with fewer than 

32,000 registered voters, or less than one percent of the 

country's voting population, Pando is the most vulnerable 


department to even small amounts of fraud or voter 

registration changes. 



¶14. (C) In a conversation with PolOff, xxxxxxxxxxxx 

xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the MAS deliberately fomented unrest in Pando 

in September to justify a military siege, depose Prefect 

Leopoldo Fernandez, and arrest opposition-aligned leaders to 

swing the balance of power to the MAS in the Senate.  Besides 

disabling the opposition's ability to campaign by arresting 


many of its leaders,xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the government crackdown 

changed Pando's electoral map by causing hundreds of 

opposition voters to flee to Brazil while importing 2,000 new 

security forces, which xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed were likely MAS voters 

from the Altiplano (Reftel B).  xxxxxxxxxxxx added 

that in the run-up to the August 2008 referendum, Government 

Minister Alfredo Rada facilitated the establishment of fake 

identities via the police role in issuing national identity 

cards (which can then be used to vote).  (Reftel C). 




- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

January 26: What Happens Next? 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 



¶15. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolOff December 31 that 

a general election prompted by passage of the new 

constitution requires a plethora of enabling legislation that 

the opposition-controlled Senate will block, at least in the 

forms likely to be proposed by the MAS (Reftel B).  xxxxxxxxxxxx 


said the new draft constitution is deliberately vague, which 

grants MAS legislators wide discretion to "fill in the 

blanks" with new implementing legislation.  He also said the 

Senate would clash with the government on assigning new 

borders for electoral districts, needed for the general 

election.  xxxxxxxxxxxx added that Morales' MAS party is 

already injecting "ridiculous" interpretations of the 

constitution into a wide gamut of implementing legislation 

that "the Senate cannot in good conscious agree to."  He said 


Senate rejection of MAS proposals provides a ready excuse for 

Morales to dismiss congress for "rejecting the will of the 

people" and then have President Morales rule by decree 

(Reftel D). 



¶16. (C) Despite the official government position that 

President Morales will undergo treatment to correct a 

deviated septum immediately following the referendum, several 

contacts confirm that the problem is actually a tumor in the 


pituitary near the sella turcica and that Morales will travel 

to Spain for the operation.  xxxxxxxxxxxx 

xxxxxxxxxxxx told us Morales' first choice, Cuba, could not 

perform the surgery.  Article 238 is also of consequence to 

the post-January 25 political landscape.  It would establish 

that all other government officials must stand down three 

months before general elections expected in 2009, with the 

notable exception of the president and vice president. 

Besides providing the MAS the advantage of ruling during the 


campaign, it also ensures leadership cannot pass to the 

opposition-controlled Senate.  It is unclear why the 

opposition waited until the final week before the referendum 

to complain about the article or why they accepted it during 

marathon sessions in October to arrive at a "compromise 

text," which, it should be noted, the opposition agreed to 

under duress, with thousands of MAS-aligned protesters 

surrounding the congress and threatening violence. 




- - - - 

Comment 

- - - - 



¶17. (C) It is likely there will be some amount of fraud in a 

referendum the MAS seems likely to win legitimately anyway. 

While it can be difficult to separate fact from fiction, the 

Morales administration has a reputation of doing exactly what 

they announce they will do.  In this case, 66 percent seems 


to be the target number, and the MAS is likely to pull out 

all the stops to reach that level.  With at least two-thirds 

support across the country and a minimum of five of the nine 

departments under his belt, President Morales would be able 

to claim a political mandate to implement the constitution 

quickly.  Practically speaking, this will put great pressure 

on the Congress, especially the opposition-controlled Senate, 

to acquiesce in negotiations and accept MAS versions of 

implementation legislation.  If they do not, Morales and 


others in the MAS have spoken of rule by decree.  Using 

similar logic, Morales could call for early elections to more 

quickly advance the "democratic revolution" in Bolivia. 

Early elections would also help the MAS avoid dealing with 

the quickly-crumbling economy, which would likely be more of 

an issue in December. 



¶18. (C) Both sides seem to be angling over the margin of the 

MAS victory, not the victory itself.  While Morales continues 


to predict a victory of up to 80 percent, Vice President 

Garcia 

Linera tried to manage expectations with a 66 percent 

estimate on January 21.  The margin matters.  If the 

constitution gets less than two-thirds support, many 

observers feel this would represent a relative defeat, 

especially when Morales himself has set such high 

expectations.  On the other hand, we are equally concerned 

that large-margin victories in media luna departments could 


lead opposition leaders to ignore the national results and 

resume a course for autonomy on their own terms -- putting 

them on a collision course with the national government.  A 

solid but not overwhelming MAS victory, perhaps around 56 to 

60 percent, might be the best outcome to keep both sides from 

claiming a strong mandate for extreme measures. 

URS